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 There has, of recent, emerged a growing concern among 
scholars and policy makers, including bilateral and 
multilateral donors, to capture the relationship between 
democratization, adjustment, and governance in Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia.  As it pertains specifically to Africa, 
this concern is but the latest phase of the largely donor-
driven quest to re-structure African economies and societies 
on the basis of a doctrinaire market philosophy.  Prior to 
this phase, the overwhelming focus of attention was on 
strictly macro-economic issues related to the causes of the 
crises in African economies and how these crises might be 
tackled within the framework of structural adjustment 
programmes designed, almost without exception, by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  By 
the end of the 1980s however, as recognition grew of the 
importance of studying and coming to terms with the macro-
political and macro-social questions associated with 
structural adjustment implementation, scholars and policy 
makers began to address more seriously, issues related to 
the political and administrative pre-requisites for economic 
reform as well as the political and social consequences of 
the reform process itself.  This development was 
strengthened by the wave of "democratization" that was 
sweeping through the former Soviet bloc, including the 
defunct Soviet Union itself towards the end of the 1980s and 
in the early 1990s as well as the evident resurgence of 
consciousness on a global scale with regard to questions of 
democracy, human rights, and popular participation however 
defined.  The earlier experience of the countries of Latin 
America with transitions from military to civilian rule 
through elections also served to underline the urgent 
necessity to address issues of democratization, economic 
development and governance in Africa especially as countries 
such as Mexico, Argentina, even Chile where political 
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reforms were undertaken began to enjoy some modest economic 
growth. 
 
 Although, on the face of things, it would seem that 
much of the current interest in the issue of 
democratization, economic reform and governance emanates 
from the international donor agencies presently involved in 
Africa, especially the World Bank, it is important to 
emphasize at this stage that long before the donor community 
turned its attention to this question, numerous African 
groups and social forces had been involved in struggles for 
the expansion of the democratic space on the continent as 
well as for the institution of structures of governance that 
would permit the will of the majority of the people to 
prevail.  This is evident from the entire history of the 
anti-colonial struggle which was as much about political 
reforms as about economic and social change with a view to 
enhancing individual liberties and popular participation.  
The post-colonial period, characterized by the abandonment 
in many cases of the African anti-colonialist nationalist 
project, has also witnessed, in practically every country, 
spirited struggles against the imposition of one party and 
military rule, the institution of personal rule with all of 
the clientelist networks woven around it, the proliferation 
of corruption and bureaucratic red-tape, and the de-
politicisation of the people.  These struggles continued 
with varying levels of intensity until the mid-1980s onwards 
when, with the rapidly changing international environment to 
which we drew attention earlier, the domestic social forces 
for change in the way Africa had been governed politically 
and economically were emboldened and and re-asserted 
themselves to unleash popular pressures for democratic 
reform towards the end of the 1980s. 
 
 So strong were the domestic pressures for political and 
economic reforms in Africa towards the end of the 1980s, and 
so massive was the level of popular participation in the 
struggle for change that some commentations were to remark, 
rather hastily, that Africa was on the threshold of a 
"second    liberation". Whereas the first libration resulted 
from the historic defeat of the forces of colonialism, the 
second liberation would lead to greater democratization and 
economic rationality.  Yet many of those who popularized 
this view, fascinated as they were by the images of tens of 
thousands of African men, women and children (hitherto 
considered as politically docile) actively demanding 
political reform, hardly bothered to examine the democratic 
content of the demands and the sustainability of democratic 
change in the context of deepening economic crises and 
competing ethnicities.  Be that as it may, it was the 
confluence of domestic and external pressures for political 
and economic reform in Africa that provided the impetus for 
the donor community to develop a keen interest in the 
relationship between democratization, adjustment, and 
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governance.  A category of donors, namely Western 
governments and their official and agencies, went on to 
embrace a new "political conditionality" under which 
economic aid was tied to the progress of African governments 
with political reform and respect for human rights.  Yet, as 
we shall see in greater detail later, the notions of 
political and economic reform which the donors have 
generally attempted to promote in Africa run counter to 
those held by the main bearers within the continent of the 
struggle for democratization and popular participation.  
Whereas, to cite one example, the donors see structural 
adjustment and what the World Bank describes as "good 
governance" as being compatible, many of the social forces 
in the vanguard of the struggle for democratization not only 
reject the structural adjustment programmes but also insist 
that they are incompatible with popular participation and 
responsive governance.  At the root of these conflicting 
positions between the democratic forces pushing for change 
in Africa and the donors championing reforms are sharply 
differing perceptions of African problem.  Let us now 
examine the theoretical sources of these differences. 
 
ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 
SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES
 
 Structural adjustment programmes were introduced into 
Africa on a massive scale from the early 1980s onward at a 
time when most African economies were already caught in deep 
crises of accumulation.  These crises manifested themselves 
not only in terms of rapidly declining output and 
productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors but 
also in terms of worsening payments and budget deficits, 
acute shortages of inputs and soaring inflation, growing 
domestic debt and a major problem of external debt 
management, decaying infrastructure, a massive flight of 
capital and declining per capital GDP and GNP among others.  
The reform programmes which were introduced under donor 
pressure and supervision were aimed at stabilizing the 
African economies, re-structuring the basis for 
accumulation, and permitting the resumption of growth.  What 
the medium to long-term effects of the adjustment programmes 
would be not only on the economy but also on the practice of 
politics and the process of administration became the 
subject of a major theoretical debate involving two broad 
schools.  The differing positions articulated by both 
schools, namely, the Neo-liberal and the Radical Political 
Economy schools, is, in many respects, a function of their 
understanding of the sources of the African economic crises 
and the role of the post-colonial state in the developmental 
process. 
 
 Championed largely by Africanists based in the United 
States but also drawing followers from within the African 
continent and elsewhere, the Neo-liberal school takes as its 
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starting point the view that the post-colonial African state 
has failed in its developmental mission because of its 
excessive and counterproductive intervention in domestic 
economic processes, its over-bureaucratization and excessive 
size, the domination of its apparatuses by clientelist 
networks and an urban coalition that orients it against the 
rural sector, its monopolization of the main economic levers 
of society with the resultant proliferation of rent-seeking 
activites, and its   over-centralization which has 
discouraged local initiative.  Given the domination of the 
economy by the state or by a statist logic, it is not 
surprising that the failure of the state easily translates 
into the failure of the economy.  In the view of the Neo-
liberals, structural adjustment whic is aimed, inter alia, 
at rolling back the frontiers of the state, trimming its 
size, encouraging the emergence of economic rationality 
through the unfettered rule of the impersonal forces of the 
market, and promoting the growth of the private sector, 
should be beneficial for the emergence and sustenance of 
democracy and a better system of governance than the neo-
patrimonial structures that pervade the continent and which 
underlie public policy. Elaborating the position of the Neo-
liberals, Larry Diamong argues that part of the reason for 
the failure of democracy to sink roots in Africa has to do 
with the fact that the bourgeois class which could have 
championed it was either non existent (because of state 
domination of the economy) or too heavily dependent on the 
state and immersed in compradorial, rent-seeking activities.  
Structural adjustment, in altering the basis for economic 
activity will encourage the formation a bourgeois more 
grounded in production and, therefore, autonomous of the 
state.  It is this bourgeoisie that will, out of self-
interest, seek to promote democratization and a more open 
system of government not based on clientelism, neo-
patrimonialism, or prebendalism.  For Diamond therefore, 
 
 '... the incrasing movement away from statist economic 
plicies is among the most significant boosts to the 
democratic prospects in Africa"1. 
 
 
 In addition to the expectation that structural 
adjustment will lead to the creation of a non-parasitic 
African bourgeoisie that will then bear the flag of 
democracy and transparent governance, the Neo-liberals have 
also argued that the process of the retrenchment of the 
state should result in the strengthening of civil society 
and associational life which, in turn, should enhance 
Africa's democratic prospects.  The adjustment programme, by 
emphasizing the role of the private sector and encouraging 
the channelling of resources to private, non-state groups 
will not only help to strengthen civil society, the bastion 
of democracy, but will also generate interest at the level 
of society on how the state is governed.  Not a few studies 
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have been published within this framework celebrating the 
rise and activities of voluntary associations and non-
governmental groups in civil society (Kasfir, 1984;  Azarya, 
1988; Bratton, 1990;  Rothchild and Chazan, 1988).  The 
vacation by the state of certain economic and social spheres 
as part of the process of structural adjustment helped to 
stimulate the rise of voluntary and non-governmental groups 
and thus promoted the pluralism essential for democray and 
transparent governance.  It is worth pointing out at this 
stage that for many of the Neo-liberals, civil society is 
treated uncritically as the arena of democracy and democracy 
itself is defined in terms of accountability.  Furhtermore, 
governance is hardly discussed beyond openness in the 
governmental process and accountability;  the centrality of 
democracy to meaningful governance is not adequately 
analyzed.  Finally, the neo-liberals treat structural 
adjustment uncritically, accepting at face value the 
objectives which its authors attribute to it and ignoring 
the reality arising from its implementation, not least the 
continuing centrality of the state and the resilience of 
rent-seeking activities. 
 
 Against the Neo-liberals, the Radical Political 
Economists contend, with justification, that structural 
adjustment and democracy are incompatible.  Given that 
structural adjustment demands the imposition of additional 
economic burden on the working people and the poor (for 
example the imposition of so-called cost recovery measures 
in the educational and health sectors;  the elimination of 
subsidies, real and invented;  the curtailment of the 
welfare and social expenditure of the state;  and the high 
inflationary consequences of price deregulation and rapid 
devaluation, among others), it is to be expected that its 
implementation will be resisted.  Resistance against 
structural adjustment is not limited just to the working 
class and the urban and rural poor.  Significant sections of 
the middle class, especially the professionals and the 
manufacturing class whose interests are adversely affected 
by the programme also offer resistance to its 
implementation.  Faced with the unpopularity of the 
adjustment programme but feeling compelled to implement it 
because of donor pressure and conditionality, African 
governments resort to repression and authoritarianism in 
order to push through the macro-economic reform package 
prescribed for them by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  In the view of the Radical Political 
Economists therefore, authoritarianism rather than democracy 
and democratic governance is the flipside of structural 
adjustment implementation in Africa (Beckman 1990; Bangura 
1991, Olukoshi 1991; 1993;  Mkandawire, 1991;  Mamdani, 
1991;  Gibbon et al, 1992). 
 
 Being economically repressive, structural adjustment 
requires a politically repressive framework for its 
7 
implementation.  Regimes implementing the programme not only 
resort to undemocratic methods of pushing it through, they 
also make spirited efforts to control the flow of 
information and to undermine the opposition. According to 
the Radical Political Economists, it is the process of 
organization of resistance to the authoritarianism and 
repression associated with structural adjustment 
implementation that begins to open up democratic 
possibilities based on the self-organization of groups 
opposed to the programme and in spite of state 
repressiveness.  If therefore the period of implementation 
of structural adjustment has witnessed a revival of the 
democratic consciousness of many of Africa's social groups 
as evidenced by the public demonstrations for political 
change in all the four corners of the continent, it is not 
because of structural adjustment but inspite of it.  In 
their bid to protect themselves against the repressive 
economic content and political repercussions of structural 
adjustment, various groups adversely affected by the 
programme, and whose organized resistance at the trade 
union, students union and professional association level the 
state attempted to prevent, had no option than to bear the 
flag of democratization and the freedom of organization.  
This resistance was aided by the wave of "democratization" 
that swept through the former Soviet bloc and the extremely 
limited achievement of the adjustment programme itself.  All 
over Africa, inspite of the authoritarianism of the 
structurally adjusting governments, few results were 
achieved, a fact which compelled a re-assessment among the 
intellectual advocates of the programme and the donors who 
pushed it into the African policy framework.  It is to the 
credit of the Radical Political Economists that their 
conceptual insight was borne out by the concrete experiences 
of African countries implementing structural adjustment.  
The persistence of clientelism and rent-seeking activities, 
the collapse of productive activity, widespread corruption 
and authoritarian methods ot resource allocation in the face 
of structural adjustment made the prospect of democratic 
governance in the context of market-based economic reforms 
seem a remote possibility in Africa. This seemed to be all 
the more so as the state has not as yet exhausted itself as 
a source of "primitive accumulation" for the emerging 
bourgeoisie. 
 
THE DONOR PERSPECTIVE ON ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
 
 Between the end of the 1970s and the end of the 1980s, 
virtually all African governments had been compelled to 
adopt and implement structural adjustment in order to avoid 
donor corss-conditionality.  Yet, after over a decade of 
structural adjustment implementation in Africa, mostly in an 
authoritarian political framework, not much was achieved by 
way of concrete of results.  On the contrary, living 
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conditions for the majority of Africans continued to 
deteriorate and the economies on the continent stagnated.  
It did not seem to matter whether the governments were 
strong, middle-of-the-road, or weak adjusters:  their common 
denominator was economic decline.  In the face of this, and 
in the context of the intensifying pressures for 
democratization on a global scale, several scholars, 
especially those American Africanists closely associated 
with multi-lateral donor agencies, began to push the case 
for the encouragement of "democratization" in Africa as a 
necessary framework for successful structural adjustment.  
From Richard Joseph to Richard Sklar, Goran Hyden and Naomi 
Chazan as well as several other participants in the work of 
the Carter Center of Emory University's "Governance in 
Africa" programme, one common theme ran through their 
analyses:  there can be no "Perestroika" (structural 
adjustment) without "Glasnost" (democratization). In the 
view of these scholars, a central reason why structural 
adjustment had failed to achieve results was the absence of 
"glasnost".  They advocated the simultaneous pursuit of 
economic and political reform if Africa was to move forward. 
 
 Although the view that structural adjustment will fare 
better under a "democratic" regime ran counter to some of 
the earlier thinking in certain donor circles on the regime 
type or structure of governance essential for the successful 
implementation of market-base economic reform, several 
donors were to jump on the international "democratic" 
Bandwagon and effect some changes to their strategy towards 
Africa.  At the forefront of this new thinking among the 
donors was the World Bank which, from the end of the 1980s, 
especially after the publication of its report entitled Sub-
Saharan Africa:  from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, came to 
champion the position that governance, defined as "... the 
use of political authority and exercise of control over a 
society and the management of its resources for 
development"2 was the missing link in Africa's developmental 
crisis.  It is necessary to state that the Bank placed 
little emphasis on democracy - pleading its lack of a 
mandate to interfere in the domestic political arrangement 
of its members and issues of democratization were hardly 
analyzed in its reports except in the framework of 
governance.  Furthermore, concern with issues of governance 
in the Bank is hardly with the objective of advancing the 
frontiers of democracy but more with achieving the 
successful implementation of the very structural adjustment 
programmes that have been so unpopular in Africa and which 
have been resisted by many groups.  In other words, the 
World Bank's interest in governance issues is 
instrumentalist to the extent that governance is seen as an 




 Faced with the record of limited achievment of almost a 
decade of structural adjustment in Africa, the World Bank 
argued that part of the reason for this had to do with the 
nature of governance in Africa.  Drawing heavily on the 
diagnosis of African governance offered by some of the 
Africanists associated with the Carter Centre's "Governance 
in Africa Programme", the World Bank blamed the continent's 
poor economic record on "bad" governance.  Stating the 
Bank's case, its former President, Barber Conable, noted 
that 
 
 "... All too offen, there is a lack of government 
accountability to the governed, a lack of encouragement 
that would liberate entrepreneurial instincts, and a 
general lack of fair competition between farmers and 
firm".3 
 
According to Conable, at the heart of Africa's problem of 
"bad" governance is the fact that all over Africa, 
 
 "Open political participation has been restricted and 
even contemned, and those brave enough to speak their 
minds have too frequently taken grave personal risks.  
I fear that many of Africa's leaders have been more 
concerned about retaining power than about the long-
term interests of their people"4. 
 
 The political and others costs of Africa's record of 
poor governance are, according to the World bank, legion.  
Conable, in taking stock of some of those costs, stated that 
 
 "... The political uncertainty and arbitrariness 
evident in so many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa are 
major constraints on the region's development.  
Investors will not take risks, entrepreneurs will not 
be creative, people will not participate if they feel 
they are facing capricious, unjust or hostile political 
environment".5 
 
Elaborating further, Conable argued that 
 
 "... Patronage and negotiation have thwarted the 
formation of professional cadres.  Investment in human 
resource development has lacked direction and 
commitment.  Such practices are a direct cause of 
Africa's economic growth rate failing in the 1980s to 
keep pace with population growth, of the debilitating 
brain drain from the region, and of the extra-ordinary 
fact that there are more expatriate advisers in African 
today than there were at the end of the colonial 
period".6 
 
 For the World Bank therefore, the critical issue in 
ensuring the success of economic reform programmes such as 
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those represented by structural adjustment is the 
institution of a system of "good" governance.  Indeed, for 
the Bank, structural adjustment and "good" governance is 
supposed to be essential for the success of structural 
adjustment, so also is structural adjustment beneficial to 
the development of "good governance".  By encouraging the 
rule of the impersonal forces of the market and instituting 
economic rationality into the process of resource 
allocation, a system of open and accountable government 
would be encouraged.  The nurturing of open and transparent 
governance will, in turn, make it difficult to justify 
irrational economic decisions. 
 
 Elaborating on the elements essential for the 
attainment of "good" governance in Africa, the World Bank 
identified the following principal parameters:  the 
accountability of government officials, including 
politicians and civil servants;  transparency in government 
procedures;  predictability in government behaviour;  
rationality of governmental decisions;  openness in 
governmental transactions;  the free flow of information;  
the institution of a system of checks and balances within 
the governmental structure; judicial autonomy; and the rule 
of law.  Bank officials also add the issue of capacity-
building to enable African technocrats to initiate and 
implement market-based economic reforms as an essential 
element of the quest for 'good' governance in Africa.  
Regimes which display the aforementioned attributes are, on 
the Bank's criteria, adjudged to have achieved "good" 
governance. 
 
 The capacity building programme of the World Bank in 
Africa was introduced against the background of earlier but 
related attempts by the institution to encourage civil 
service reform on the continent.  The objectives of the 
reforms include a desire to cut red-tape, streamline 
procedures and processes, strengthen technocrats and 
professionals, improve efficiency, and raise productivity.  
The civil service reforms formed an integral part of the 
Bank's strategy for rolling back the frontiers of the state 
and re-organizing whatever is left of its bureaucracy.  
Furthermore, as part and parcel of the adjustment programme 
of the Bank, school curricula at the tertiary level, were 
brought under scrutiny and recommendations made for 
course/departmental rationalization.  As with the reforms of 
the civil service, the claim was that the educational sector 
reforms proposed by the Bank will make African tertiary 
education more 'relevant' and result-oriented, not to speak 
of cost-effective.  Also, there is the claim that the 
reduction of the member of universities/polytechnics will 
help to channel resources to intermediate level technical 
manpower development which is lacking in large numbers in 
Africa.  The re-organization of university curricula should 
also enable government to de-emphasize the liberal arts and 
11 
strengthen the technical and engineering services.  A closer 
linkage between the educational sector and the private 
sector has also been promoted by the Bank as part of the 
reform agenda. 
 
 Other donors, particularly the Western governments and 
their aid agencies, in line with the position that there 
cannot be "perestroika" without "glasnost", have explicitly 
advocated and attempted to implement a new political 
conditionality linking aid and other resources flow to 
Africa to respect for human rights and implementation of 
"democratic" reforms by African governments.  As stated by 
Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, 
 
 "...the relief of poverty, hunger and disease is one of 
the main tasks of overseas aid. Aid must go where it can 
clearly do good. Countries tending towards pluralism, public 
accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights 
and market principles should be encouraged. Those who 
persist with repressive policies, with corrupt management, 
or with wasteful and discredited economic systems should not 
expect us to support them fully with scare aid resources 
which could be better used elsewhere."7 
 
 In essence, therefore, for the leading Western official 
and donors, democracy, defined in terms of multi-partyism 
and public accountability are essential to successful 
structural adjustment. 
 
 It is worth stressing at this stage that at the bottom 
of the concern in the donor community about questions of 
democratization and governance is the desire to promote the 
emergence of a conducive political climate for the 
successful implementation of structural adjustment. The view 
seems to have grown among the donors that a "democratic" 
political framework based on the consent of the people and 
on transparent governance will better enhance the prospects 
for successful structural adjustment than a dictatorial, 
unrepresentative regime benefit of credibility and 
legitimacy. In support of this perspective, the donors have 
strived to reach out directly to civil society groups, 
including community associations. Special effort has been 
made to encourage the formation of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as part of the strategy for 
strengthening urban and rural civil society. Yet the basic 
difficulty with the donor perspective is that the main 
bearers of the struggle for democracy and democratic 
governance in Africa are also in the frontline of the 
struggle against structural adjustment. Many of them have 
sharpened their strategies for the democratization of their 
societies from their experience of resisting the 
authoritarian practices associated with the implementation 
of structural adjustment. Let us elaborate further on this 
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by way of a summary of the critique of the donor perspective 
on adjustment, democratization, and governance. 
 
CRITIQUE OF THE DONORS PERSPECTIVE ON ADJUSTMENT, 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
 
 The main issues which have been raised in the donor 
perspective on adjustment, democratization, and governance 
have been subjected to severe criticism by scholars and 
activists alike. The question of the compatibility of 
structural adjustment and democratization is one which we 
have addressed earlier and it has featured prominently in 
the critique of the donors. Attention has been drawn to the 
fact that the relationship between the donors and African 
governments is hardly a democratic one since the donors rely 
on a host of conditionalities in their dealings with the 
governments. Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
content of the adjustment programmes is itself anti-
democratic as is the method of implementation of the reform 
packages which brooks no opposition in part because the 
donors strongly sanction governments that fail to meet 
agreed targets for performance. The undermining of 
productive activities by the adjustment policies of the 
World Bank and the IMF rules out the claim of the 
programme's advocates that it would result in the growth of 
a democratizing bourgeoisie. In fact many of the local 
groups that were involved in manufacturing production have 
been pushed back into rent-seeking and compradorial 
activities in response to the adverse effects on their 
productive operations of structural adjustment. 
 
 As to the question of governance, the various 
attributes of "good" governance identified by the World Bank 
have neither been encouraged by the implementation of 
structural adjustment no reflected in the way the Bank and 
African governments have tried to push through the 
programme. Since the implementation of structural adjustment 
started, leaders have strived to limit the flow of 
information both on the reform programme and generally. The 
officials charged with implementing the unpopular reform 
programme have seen themselves as being more accountable to 
the donors who exercice direct leverage over them and not to 
their populace who bear the brunt of the market reform 
policies. After-all, almost without exception, negotiations 
between the IMF and the World Bank on the one hand and 
various African governments on the other, were held in 
secret and the decision to implement adjustment policies did 
not allow much room for consultation with the people or 
internal and open policy debates within the governmental 
system. Furthermore, transparency in governmental operations 
has hardly been enhanced by structural adjustment. In fact, 
the problem of corruption has been deepened by the programme 
in many cases. The sharp decline in living standards 
occasioned by structural adjustment has encouraged petty 
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corruption among some categories of workers. Among ruling 
class elements, new forms of adjustment policies introduced 
by various governments. The rule of law and the independence 
of the judiciary hardly have a place in a framework 
characterized by the forcible implementation by unpopular 
governments of unpopular adjustment policies. 
 
 Still on the question of governance, structural 
adjustment has had far-reaching adverse effects for the 
administrative structure and capacity of many African 
states. Many civil service organizations have been 
practically paralysed as civil servants, faced with 
diminishing real incomes and ever-rising costs of living, 
resort to moonlighting activities which erode their 
effectiveness. Also, the information of many state 
structures, especially those associated with the provision 
of social services, as a result diminishing resource flows 
for their sustenance, not only further weakens the 
legitimacy of the state but also the very structures of 
governance essential to the implementation of development 
programmes. The personalization of state office which has 
remained rampant coupled with widespread market failure has 
further compounded the problem of governance in Africa as 
has the deepening of uneven development in a continent 
characterized by competing ethnicities. 
 
 In order for democracy and democratic governance to 
prevail and become institutionalized, there must be social 
groups within various countries that have an interest in 
them. Yet, ironically, those very social groups that have 
pushed the case for the democratization of the African 
State, economy, governmental structure, and society and 
which are the ones capable of bearing the struggle for it 
are not only those most adversely affected by structural 
adjustment but are also rejected by the most influential 
donors as "parasites" to be undermined politically as part 
of the bid to dislodge the influence of the urban coalition 
of interests which make "rational" economic policy 
impossible. These social forces - , students professionals, 
academics, etc and their organizations have been 
specifically targeted for destruction by the authors and 
implementers of adjustment programmes. Trade union, students 
organizations, professional associations and other organized 
groups opposed to structural adjustment have been smashed 
all over Africa or their organizational capacity severely 
weakened through constant official harrassment, arrest and 
imprisonments, and staged-managed divisions. 
 
 The notions of democracy and democratization which the 
students, workers, professionals and other groups with an 
interest in the reform of African politics carry run counter 
to those which the donors have tried to push. Quite apart 
from their instrumentalist approach to the democracy 
question in Africa, the overwhelmingly technicist approach 
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of the donors to the issue of governance also runs counter 
to the notions held by Africa's activists for democratic 
reform. Many of the activities emphasize in their 
articulation of the African democratic project a political 
as well as an economic and social content. Democracy for 
them is not just a question of multi-party politics and 
electioneering; it includes a vast array of social and 
economic reforms aimed at making for a more just social 
order. It is a definition which necessarily calls for an 
interventionist, developmentalist state; not for the 
unbridled retrenchment of the state. It calls for the 
thorough reforming of the state and its broad-ranging 
restructuring in order to tackle the problem of state 
failure but it also firmly rejects the World Bank/IMF 
programme for the re-definition of the role of the state. 
For these groups, there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between structural adjustment and democratization and this 
is brought out by the experiences at the various national 
conferences in parts of Francophone Africa. 
 
 From Benin Republic to the Congo, Niger and Mali to 
Chad and even Zaïre, the main issues which dominated the 
agenda of the national conferences not only relate to 
administrative and political reforms, the limiting of the 
powers of the executive, the strengthening of the judiciary 
and its independence, and the re-organization of the 
military under civilian governmental authority but also to 
far-reaching economic reforms based on a "developmentalist" 
state. Seething criticisms against IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes have been commonplace even as many of 
the conferences acknowledge the necessity for far-reaching 
economic reforms in order to stem the tide of African 
economic decline. There was a recognition too of the need to 
strengthen state capacity even as the democratization of 
state structures and procedures are undertaken. Quite 
clearly, popular perception within Africa on the reform of 
African economies and the democratization of the state and 
society run counter to the views held and pushed by the 
donors, especially the World Bank. 
 
 Finally, regarding the question of capacity-building 
which has featured in the discussion on governance and 
structural adjustment and in support of which the World Bank 
launched an African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI), it 
is clear that donor-driven market reforms have contributed 
substantially to undermining indigenous capacity in Africa. 
While few will doubt that the availability in abundance of 
professionally competent economists, policy analysts, 
managers, auditors, jurists and other professionals is 
essential to the promotion of "good" governance, the 
experience of the last decade under the regime of structural 
adjustment and its associated authoritarianism has been an 
exacerbation of the brain drain from Africa. Hordes of 
highly qualified personnel, trained at great expense to 
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their countries, unable to cope with or accept the social, 
economic and political costs of adjustment have sought 
greener pastures in Europe, North America, and the Middle 
East. For some, frustration, arising out of the lack of 
basic equipment with which to perform their tasks and an 
anxiety to keep abreast of changes in their professional 
fields have been the factors motivating the decision to 
leave their countries. Those professionals who for whatever 
reason have stayed behind have either had to engage in 
moolighting in order to earn extra money to supplement their 
diminishing real income or have opted for political 
appointments which are often unrelated to their professional 
training. 
 
 Without diminishing the importance of human resources 
development to the transformation of Africa, the politics of 
the World Bank's capacity building initiative for the 
continent ought to be exposed for what it is, namely that it 
is an initiative aimed at generating a ready intellectual 
and professional constituency for the Bank's adjustment 
programmes. In this regard, it would be correct to argue 
that the initiative continues the World Bank's practice of 
defining the competence of the African professional in terms 
of the professional's willingness to understand and follow 
the institution's current policy on macro-economic and other 
policy changes in Africa. Many an African professional who 
have refused to see the world through the Bank's lenses have 
been dismissed as lacking in skill. Given that a majority of 
African intellectuals are either hostile to or skeptical 
about the Bank's project in Africa, it is little wonder that 
the institution has strongly sought to push the view that 
Africa lacks a competence professional class. Clearly then, 
the Bank's capacity-building programme is an attempt to 
produce professionals who will support structural adjustment 
and extend its logic to their spheres of competence. This 
way, it should be possible to claim that adjustment measures 
are home-grown or that the adjusting governments are really 
the owners of the programmes. The issue of capacity building 
for strengthening democracy is not one that concerns the 
Bank. Indeed, in emphasizing the need for Africa's 
technocratic/professional class to be insulated from 
society, the Bank seeks to diminish accountability to the 
people by their governors. An insulated technocracy, 
unresponsive to democratic pressures and accounting only to 
donors is bound to a recipe for authoritarianism. 
 
 It is ironic that the very goal of increased efficiency 
and productivity which the World Bank claim its civil 
service reforms are meant to promote have been severely 
undermined by its structural adjustment programme. With 
extremely low wages and salaries, rising cost of living, 
spiralling inflation and diminishing career and livelihood 
prospects, many civil servants all over Africa have had to 
engage in moonlighting in order to supplement their incomes 
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and cope with rising costs. The civil service has also found 
it hard to attract high quality personnel and to retain them 
since it is unable to match private sector remuneration 
levels and career opportunities. Afflicted by critical 
shortages inspite of massive personnel retrenchment, the 
civil service has been reduced in many countries to a shadow 
of its former self. Corruption, rather than diminish, has 
become even more rampant. The paralysis which many an 
African civil service has suffered has also been the fate of 
the educational sector where, in the face of Bank - inspired 
reforms, academics, students, and university administrative 
staff have embarked upon struggles to protect their rights 
and interests. The authoritarian responses of the state to 
these struggles and the unwillingness of the Bank to yield 
ground has meant that many African institutions of higher 
learning have been paralysed by protest strikes with costly 
consequences for the economies of various countries. 
 
BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE: ALTERNATIVES TO THE DONOR PERSPECTIVE
 
 Although the donor, especially World Bank perspective 
on adjustment and governance dominated debates on Africa's 
future for much of the 1980s, from the mid-1980s onward, in 
the face of the limited achievments of the adjustment 
measures, various organizations within and outside Africa 
began to make the case for alternatives to the dominant 
donor outlook. One of the earliest and most influential of 
the cases made for alternatives was the one championed by 
the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) under 
the banner of "adjustment with a human face". UNICEF argued, 
convincingly, that the macro-economic policies associated 
with structural adjustment as well as the social effects of 
the programme generally and on women and children in 
particular were creating serious setbacks which, if 
unchecked could strenghten the structures of 
underdevelopment and weaken the structures of governance. 
UNICEF noted that many social/welfare advances that had been 
recorded in education, health, nutrition, and the other 
areas were being systematically eroded by the structural 
adjusment programmes being pursued under the aegis of the 
World Bank and the IMF in Africa and the rest of the Third 
World. In order to prevent this, UNICEF made the case for 
adjustment with a human face in which the most vulnerable 
groups in society will be protected from harsh economic 
policies and the social/welfare gains of the pre-adjustment 
period will be advanced, not eroded. Adjustment with a human 
face will have to entail the strengthening of governmental 
and administrative ability and will especially through the 
promotion of community participation. In the view of UNICEF, 
community participation has the distinct advantage of 
providing strong political support for the state's programme 
of adjustment with a human face. 
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 Shortly after the publications of UNICEF's Adjustment 
with a Human Face, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
announced its own African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery 
and Transformation (AAF-SAP). Highly critical  of IMF and 
World Bank adjustment policies in Africa, the ECA argued 
forcefully that they negated the development objective of 
the continent and failed to underline the real roots of the 
African economic crisis. The adjustment policies of the 
Bretton Woods twins, not surprisingly, failed to achieve any 
significant results - in fact, in a-lot of cases, the 
problems were compounded by their prescriptions. The ECA 
therefore made the case for an alternative adjustment 
framework which will be geared towards promoting sustainable 
development and socio-economic transformation. Whereas the 
Bretton Woods institutions opted for a doctrinaire market 
approach to solving Africa's economic problems, the ECA, 
citing the failure of that approach proposed a neo-
structuralist framework. Whereas the IMF and the World Bank 
launched indiscriminate attacks on the state, the ECA was 
more positive about the effective role which the state could 
play in Africa's socio-economic transformation. Like UNICEF, 
the ECA made the case for the re-orientation and 
strengthening of existing administrative structures with a 
view to enhancing governmental ability to administer 
programmes efficiently. Such a re-orientation, according to 
the ECA, will entail greater accountability, the 
decentralization of centralized bureaucraties, the promotion 
of grassroots initiatives and community participation/self-
management, and the promotion of indigenous non-governmental 
organizations at the community level if the goal of 
transforming Africa is to be achieved. 
 
 Both the UNICEF and ECA alternatives have been 
subjected to intense discussion and opinion is divided on 
the practicability of their programmes. There is however 
little doubt that their intervention in the debate on 
structural adjustment in Africa captured the popular mood of 
dissatisfaction on the continent and reflected the local 
quest for alternatives to the monetarist policies of the IMF 
and the World Bank. Against UNICEF however, it has been 
argued within Africa that what is needed after over a decade 
of experimentation with structural adjustment is not the 
addition of a human face to a discredited policy programme 
but its total replacement with a new policy package that is 
geared towards meeting the aspirations of the people for 
development and democracy. While the ECA's AAF-SAP may have 
attempted to transcend the policies and instruments of the 
IMF and the World Bank, like UNICEF's alternative framework, 
it failed to identify the social forces that are capable of 
bearing the struggle for the far-reaching policy changes it 
prescribes. Indeed, both UNICEF and the ECA trust a 
significant element of their programme - namely state reform 
for effective policy implementation - to political will and 
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the will itself begs too many questions. The ECA adds an 
appeal for "patriotic management" as a requirement for state 
re-orientation but does not explain why existing managerial 
attitudes are unpatriotic. 
 
 Within various African countries various 
social/interest groups, have in their response to the 
adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, proposed 
alternatives which have sought to re-instate the state in 
its thoroughly reformed form as a central player in African 
economic development. Students, academic, trade unionists, 
even some professionals and business groups in their 
critique of structural adjustment have emphasized the 
necessity for the state to be reformed and strengthened to 
play an effective developmental role. The aversion for 
doctrinaire marketization of the type which the Bank and the 
Fund have attempted to push is unmistakable in the 
alternative programmes which African social/interest groups 
have sought to promote. However, many of these alternatives 
are short on detail particularly with regard to the kind of 
framework of governance which the continent of Africa ought 
to be working towards, a framework that will permit social 
contestation without leading to political chaos and systemic 
failure and which is capable of enhancing democratic 
interaction. It is of course clear, in the light of post-
colonial African experience, that single party, military and 
diarchical forms of governance are fraught with numerous 
difficulties including their inability to promote democratic 
governance. What the democratic forces whithin Africa which 
are championing the campaign for alternatives now need to do 
is focus attention on the political framework within which 
the goal of socio-economic reconstruction can be effectively 
carried out. In other words, the challenge which the current 
African conjuncture poses to Africa's democratic forces is 
how a workable political framework can be arrived at which 
will permit economic rationality, effective state 
involvement in development, and popular democratic 
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TYPOLOGY OF EXISTING SYSTEMS OF 




 THE AFRICAN CONTINENT IS CURRENTLY WITNESSING MAJOR 
PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE WHICH 
HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN THE DEFEAT OF THE ANCIENT REGIME IN 
SEVERAL COUNTRIES. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE CONTINENT IS 
IN A STATE OF FLUX WITH FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE ALTHOUGH THE DEPTH AND SUSTAINABILITY 
OF THE REFORMS THAT HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED, PARTICULARLY AT 
THE POLITICAL LEVEL, ARE OPEN TO DEBATE. THE TYPOLOGY OF 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA WHICH IS PRESENTED HERE IS BASED ON THE 
POLITICAL MAP OF THE CONTINENT AS OF THE END OF AUGUST 1993. 
 
TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
 
 THERE ARE CURRENTLY IN AFRICA SEVEN BROAD GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS? NAMELY THE STRICTLY MILITARY, CIVILIAN/MILITARY 
DIARCHY, CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL, CIVILIAN PARLIAMENTARY, 
TRANSITIONAL/INTERIM GOVERNMENT, MONARCHICAL, AND RULE OF 
WARLORDS. LET US NOW ELABORATE ON EACH OF THESE. 
 
(i)  THE STRICTLY MILITARY:  THIS SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
HAS BEEN ON THE DECLINE IN RECENT TIMES BUT IS 
STILL WELL IN PLACE IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 
INCLUDING SIERRA LEONE AND THE SUDAN.  ALTHOUGH 
CIVILIANS ARE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, THEY ARE APPOINTEES 
OF THE MILITARY AND THE ENTIRE LOGIC OF STATE 
ADMINISTRTION IS MILITARY INSPIRED.  THE HEAD OF 
STATE IS ALSO IN BOTH CASES A MILITARY MAN. 
 
(ii)  CIVILIAN-MILITARY DIARCHY: THIS USED TO BE A 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE AND IT OFTEN INVOLVES REGIMES 
THAT CAME IN THROUGH MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT TAKING 
ON A CIVILIAN FACE BUT REMAINING STRICTLY UNDER 
THE GUARANTEE OF THE MILITARY WHILST HAVING THE 
PARTICIPATION OF CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND 
THECHNOCRATS IN THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATION.  
MANY OF THE DIARCHICAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE EITHER 
BUILT ON ONE PARTY OR NO PARTY ARRANGEMENTS 
ALTHOUGH SINCE THE 1980s, MANY OF THEM HAVE 
ADOPTED A MULTI-PARTY FRAMEWORK. AMONG THE 
COUNTIRES THAT ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING A 
DIARCHICAL ARRANGEMENT INCLUDE GUINEA (CONAKRY), 
LIBYA, ALGERIA, MAURITANIA AND EGYPT. 
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(iii) CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL:  PREVIOUSLY ONE PARTY OR 
MILITARY DOMINATED OR RUNNING A DIARCHY OF 
CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND MILITARY OFFICERS, SINCE 
THE 1890s MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF AFRICA HAVE 
ADOPTED CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS OF 
GOVERNMENT WITHIN A FORMALLY MULTI-PARTY 
FRAMEWORK.  SOME OF THEM HAVE ADOPTED THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM WITH AN ELECTED EXECUTIVE HEAD 
OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.  OTHERS HAVE ADOPTED THE 
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN 
ELECTED PRESIDENTIAL HEAD OF STATE AND AN 
APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER.  A GOOD NUMBER OF THE 
CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS, WHILST BEING DE 
JURE MULTI-PARTY ARE DE FACTO SINGLE PARTY.  
COUNTRIES PRESENTLY UNDER ONE FORM OR THE OTHER OF 
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INCLUDE ZIMBABWE, 
BOTSWANA, COTE D'IVOIRE, BURKINA FASO, GHANA AND 
THE GAMBIA, AMONG OTHERS.  ZAMBIA, MALI, AND 
LESOTHO ARE ALSO IN THIS CATEGORY ON ACCOUNT OF 
RECENT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES THAT PRODUCED OUTCOMES 
IN WHICH ONE PARTY HAS EMERGED OVERWHELMINGLY 
DOMINANT THE POSITION ELECTORALLY HUMILIATED.  
SENEGAL, KENYA, AND TO SOME EXTENT NIGER, HOWEVER 
HAVE STRONG OPPOSITION PARTIES WITH CREDIBLE, 
IRRESISTIBLE CLAIMS ON POLITICAL POWER.  ZAIRE AND 
TOGO ARE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM THAT ARE CURRENTLY 
BEDEVILED BY POLITICAL STALEMATE ON ACCOUNT OF 
UNYIELDING DICTATORSHIPS. 
 
(iv)  CIVILIAN PARLIAMENTARY:  WIDSPREAD IN AFRICA AT 
THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE LATE 1950s AND THE 
EARLY 1960s AND MOSTLY PATTERNED ALONG THE BRITISH 
WESTMINISTER SYSTEM, THIS FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNANCE 
WAS GRADUALLY REPLACED IN THE COURSE OF THE 1960s 
AND 1970s WITH PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT.  
TODAY, THERE ARE VERY FEW PARLIAMENTARY CIVILIAN 
SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT AND THEY ARE MOSTLY MULTI-
PARTY, AT LEAST DE JURE.  THE MOST PROMINENT IS 
THE ISLAND OF MAURITIUS. 
 
(v)  TRANSITIONAL/INTERIM GOVERNMENTS:  IN A FEW 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS NIGERIA, LIBERIA, 
ETHIOPIA, AND ERITREA, OWING TO DIFFERENT 
POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TRANSNATIONAL/INTERIM 
GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED AS STOP-GAP 
MEASURES PENDING THE ATTAINTMENT OF POLITICAL 
NORMALCY.  ERITREA HAS HAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT 
AS A STRATEGY FOR THE RUN-UP TO ITS INDEPENDENCE 
IN 1993 AND IS RETAINING IT FOR A FEW MORE YEARS.  
LIBERIA IS EMERGING FROM CIVIL WAR AND IS GEARING 
UP FOR MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. ETHIOPIA ADOPTED A 
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE 
MENGISTU MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WHILE IN THE CASE 
OF NIGERIA, AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS INSTALLED BY 
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THE DISCREDITED DISCTATORSHIP OF THE MILITARY 
REGIME OF GENERAL BABANGIDA.  IN ALL CASES, THE 
TRANSITIONAL OR INTERIM GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
ARE DOGGED BY CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION AND MAY 
YET BE UNDERMINED BY UNRESOLVED POLITICAL 
CONTRADICTIONS. 
 
(vi)  MONARCHICAL SYSTEM: THESE HAVE DECLINED IN NUMBER 
SINCE AFRICAN COUNTRIES ATTAINED INDEPENDENCE IN 
THE 1950s AND 1960s.  IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES LIKE 
ETHIOPIA AND LESOTHO, ONCE POWERFUL MONARCHS WERE 
TOPPLED.  IN SWAZILAND AND MOROCCO HOWEVER, IT 
APPEARS THE EXECUTIVE MONARCH SYSTEM BASED ON AN 
APPOINTED CABINET HEADED BY A PRIME MINISTER, IS 
STILL ENTRENCHED ALTHOUGH OPPOSITION IS GROWING.  
THE SWAZI AND MOROCCAN MONARCHS ARE OF COURSE THE 
HEADS OF THEIR STATES AND IN THIS EXECUTIVE 
CAPACITY CAN APPOINT AND DISMISS CABINETS. 
 
(vii) RULE OF WARLORDS:  IN COUNTRIES WHERE THAT 
STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER HAS RESULTED IN 
SYSTEMIC BREAKDOWN, THE RULE OF WARLORDS HAS TAKEN 
SWAY.  THE MOST PROMINENT OF THESE IS SOMALIA 
WHERE WAR CORDISM PAR EXCELLENCE RULES, A CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT TOTALLY NON-EXISTENT.  TO SOME EXTENT, 
ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE ARE FACED WITH STRONG WAR 
LORDIST PRESSURES ALTHOUGH THEIR CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENTS HAVE MANAGED TO HOLD ON TO THE CENTRE 
AND RETAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.  IN SOMALIA, 
THERE IS NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO BE RECOGNIZED 
AND ALL STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE HAVE BEEN 
DESTROYED.  LIBERIA WAS FOR A WHILE IN THE SOMILI 
SITUATION AS WAS CHAD.  BOTH NOW HAVE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE TRANSITIONAL ALTHOUGH WAR 
LORDIST PRESSURES ARE STILL STRONG.  TRANSNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION, IN THE CASE OF SOMALIA UNDER THE 
FORMAL AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HAS BEEN 
NECESSARY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A SEMBLANCE OF 
ORDER. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The deep-seated economic, political, and social crises 
which have enveloped virtually all African states for 
several years now have remaind a main focus of policy and 
scholarly attention within and outside Africa.  Among the 
issues which have been most widely discussed and debated are 
the impact on Africa's economic, political, and social 
processes of IMF/World Bank - style structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPS) which were introduced in most African 
states in the course of the 1980s as a strategy for checking 
economic decline on the continent.  In the context of the 
debates on the impact of the SAPS, issues of democratization 
and governance have been brought to the fore. 
 
 As it regards democratization, discusion on the subject 
has been intensified by the open pressures for the 
pluralization of political life in many African countries 
with some scholars insisting, after several years of neo-
liberal economic reform in Africa, that there can be no 
successful "perestroika" (i.e SAP) without a simultaneous 
programme of "glasnost" ("democracy" - often interpreted as 
multipartyism and public accountability).  In official 
Western and circles, anxiety to join the African 
"democratic" bandwagon has resulted in yet another 
conditionality clause, the so-called political 
conditionality which aims to link aid to respect for human 
rights and the institution of multiparty politics. 
 
As to the issue of governance, recent interest in it in the 
context of structural adjustment has been most extensively 
expressed by the donor community led by the World Bank.  The 
Bank has, in some of its publications, attempted to pin the 
poor achievement of several years of structural adjustment 
in Africa on the absence of "good governance".  "Good 
governance, for the donors has to do primarily with 
accountability, the rule of law, free flow of information, 
transparency in governmental processes and procedures, and 
"responsible" management of public affairs, among others. 
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 This select bibliography has been complied with a view 
to assisting the participants in the CODESRIA Summer 
Institute on Adjustment, Democratization and Governance to 
identify easily some of the most important materials 
necessary for grasping the on-going debate on a subject 
which, in a sense, has dominated much of the recent analyses 
on Africa's problems and prospects.  The select bibliography 
includes books and articles that are considered to be useful 
on structural adjustment in Africa, the question of 
democratization on the continent, and the issue of 
governance. More importantly, most of the published 
materials that have attempted one way or the other to 
establish a linkage between adjustment, democratization and 
governance are also included and are distinguished from the 
other recommended references by an asterisk. 
 
2. Suggested Readings (Books and Articles) 
 
*1. Patrick Chabal (ed), Political Domination in Africa, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
*2. Samuel Paul, Accountability in Public Services:  Exit, 
Voice and Capture, (Washington, DC:  World Bank, 1990). 
 
*3. Ismail Serageldin, "Governance, Democracy and the World 
Bank in Africa". World Bank, Washington D.C., 1990. 
 
*4. Ismail Serageldin, "Sovereignty, Governance and the 
Role of International Institutions", World Bank, 
Washington D.C., 1991 (Memeographed). 
 
 5. Ismail Serageldin, "Culture, Empowerment and the 
Development Paradigm", World Bank, Washington D.C., 
1990 (Memeographed). 
 
*6. John Lonsdale, "Political Accountability in Africa" in 
P. Chabal (ed), Political Domination in Africa... 
op.cit. 
 
 7. Joan Nelson (ed), Fragile Coalitions:  The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick and Oxford:  
Transaction Broks, 1989). 
 
 8. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
 
*9. I. Shihata, "Issues of Governance in Borrowing Members:  
The Extent of their Relevance and the Bank's Articles 
of Agreement", memo of Vice President and General 
Counsel.  World Bank, Washington DC, 21 December, 1990. 
 
25 
*10. David Apter and Carl Rosberg (eds), Political 
Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1991). 
 
*11. Dunstan Wai, "Governance and the Development Crisis in 
Sub-Saharan Africa", in David Apter and Carl Rosberg 
(eds).  Political Development..., Ibid. 
 
*12. Dunstan Wai, "Governance, Economic Development and the 
Role of External Actors", Oxford (Mimeo), 1991. 
 
*13. Ismail Serageldin and Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance 
and the External Factor", Oxford, 1991, (Mimeo). 
 
 14. D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds), The Precarious 
Balance:  State and Society in Africa (Colorado;  
Westview Press, 1988). 
 
 15. Peter Anyang' Nyong'O (ed.) Popular Struggles for 
Democracy in Africa (London:  Zed Press/UNU, 1987. 
 
 16. Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds)  Structural 
Adjustment in Africa (London:  Macmillan, 1989). 
 
*17. Giovanni A. Cornia, Rolf Van der Hoeven, and Thandika 
Mkandawire (eds.), Africa's Recovery in the 1990s:  
From Stagnation and Adjustment to Human Development 
(Florence;  UNICEF, 1992). See also summary of the book 
in the same title prepared by John de St. Jorre. 
 
 18. Bade Onimode (ed), The IMF, the World Bank and the 
African Debt (2vol) (London:  Zed Press, 1989). 
 
 19. G.K. Helleiner (ed), Africa and the International 
Monatry Fund (IMF:  Washington DC, 1986). 
 
 20. Kjell Havnevik (ed) The IMF and the World Bank in 
Africa (Uppsala:  SIAS, 1987). 
 
 21. G. Cornia et al Adjustment with a Human Face:  
Protecting the Vulnerable and promoting Growth (Oxford:  
Oxford Univresity Press, 1987). 
 
*22. Geoffrey Hawthorne, "Good Governance and Democracy:  
How/Why African States Fall Short", Oxford, (Mimeo, 
1991). 
 
*23. Henry S. Bienen and Mark Gersovitz, "Economic 
Stabilization, Conditionality, and Political Stability" 
International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1985. 
 
 24. Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State:  Civil Society and 
Associational Life in Africa", World Politics, Vol. 
XLI, No. 3, 1989. 
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 25. Joan Nelson (ed.) Economic Crisis and Policy Choice:  
The Politics of Economic Adjustment in the Third World 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1990). 
 
 26. Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle:  Zaire in 
Comparative Perspective (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1984). 
 
*27. Larry Diamond et al. Democracy in Developing Countries: 
Volume two, Africa (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 1988). 
 
 28. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black 
Africa (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
1982). 
 
*29. The Carter Centre of Emory University, Beyond Autocracy 
in Africa:  Working Papers from the Inaugural Seminar 
of the African Governance Programme (Atlanta:  The 
Carter Centre, 1989). 
 
*30. The Carter Centre of Emory University, African 
Governance in the 1990s:  Objectives, Resources, and 
Constraints, Working papers from the Second Annual 
Seminars of the African Governance Programme (Atlanta:  
the Carter Centre, 1990). 
 
 31. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa:  
The Political basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1981). 
 
 32. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa:  
The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1981). 
 
 32. Robert Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural 
Africa (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
 
*33. Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in 
Nigeria:  The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 
 34. W. Johnson and V. Johnson, West African Governments and 
Volunteer Development Organizations:  priorities for 
Partnership, (Maryland:  University Press of America, 
1990). 
 
 35. Richard Sandbrook, "State and Economic Stagnation in 
Tropical Africa", World Development, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
1988. 
 
*36. Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic St 




 37. Richard Sklar, "Developmental Democracy", Comparative 
Studies in Politics and History, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1987. 
 
 38. Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena, 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1976). 
 
 39. D.A. Rustow "Transitions to Democracy:  Towards a 
Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, No. 2, April 
1970. 
 
 40. Richard Sklar, "Democracy in Africa", African Studies 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 3-4, 1983. 
 
 41. J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds), The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978). 
 
*42. Yusuf Bangura, Crisis, Adjustment and Politics in 
Nigeria, AKUT 38, Uppsala, 1989. 
 
*43. Yusuf Bangura, "Structural Adjustment and the Political 
Question", Review of African Political Economy., No. 
37, 1986. 
 
*44. Yusuf Bangura, "Democracy and Development in the Third 
World:  a Conference Proposal", (Mimeo), Geneva, 1989. 
 
 45. Yusuf Bangura, Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in 
Africa:  A Theoretical Discourse, UNRISD Discussion 
Paper No. 18, 1991. 
 
 46. Yusuf Bangura, "The Crisis of Undervelopment and the 
Transition to Civil Rule:  Conceptualizing the Question 
of Democracy in Nigeria, Africa Development, Vol. XIII, 
No. 1, 1989. 
 
 47. Yusuf Bangura and Bjorn Beckman "Africa Workers and 
Structural Adjustment" in A. Olukoshi (ed.) The 
Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (London:  
James Currey, 1993). 
 
*48. Bjorn Beckman, "Whose Democracy?  Bourgeois Versus 
Popular Democracy in Africa" Review of African 
Political Economy, Nos 45/46, 1989. 
 
*49. Bjorn Beckman, "State, Underdevelopment and Democracy:  
Nigeria, 1975-1990" (Mimeo), Zaria, 1987. 
 
 50. Bjorn Beckman, "The Post-Colonial State:  Crisis and 
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